

CHAPTER IV

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PLANNING AS AN ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Harland Bartholomew's second great contribution was to bring about acceptance of the planning function as one of the several responsibilities of local government. This was not the case when he entered the profession. It is very much the case today. If a system could be devised to make a comprehensive plan, a similar system could be outlined to carry out the plan.

To Harland Bartholomew the plan was not the end. The end desired was an improved city--a much better place in which to live and work, more beautiful to be in and more efficient and economical to operate. He emphasized that the only way to secure these objectives was to prepare and carry out a comprehensive plan. (It still is.)

When he examined the average American city, he found that it was being built in very small increments, not by neighborhoods or large projects. It was really a process of accretion accompanied by a process of change. To control these processes (to require that each bit conform with the comprehensive plan), it was necessary to affect hundreds, if not thousands, of human actions that took place almost every hour of every day--continuously. You could not just prepare a comprehensive city plan, no matter how noble or how carefully prepared, and


expect this "multitude of human impulses" (1) to suddenly conform, particularly, when a good part (perhaps a fourth to a third) of these human impulses were mistaken, not in the public interest, and in need of being redirected or abandoned.

What to do?

A FULL-TIME PLANNING STAFF

The continuous processes of accretion and change - these innumerable human actions - would have to be made to conform to a plan and directed toward a common goal. This means that each such action would first have to be examined, or judged. Someone would have to monitor each proposed change and see that it was modified or abandoned when it did not "conform." The continuous nature of the two processes required a similarly continuous supervision. To Harland Bartholomew this meant two things:

First, that the comprehensive plan must be made locally, in order to fit most closely to the local circumstances and to obtain the maximum amount of local interest and participation in its preparation. The plan had to have supporters, to have a constituency. When a comprehensive plan was prepared, a representative of



40 Harland Bartholomew believed that you kept a Comprehensive Plan alive by carrying it out. He constantly reminded the people of the great progress being made, and that their plan was at work everyday.

Harland Bartholomew and Associates would be stationed in the city, work in the city hall, and prepare the plan with the assistance of "experts" in various phases of the plan who would visit from the home office. Some "experts" were full-time staff members. Others, such as W. W. Horner, Thomas Seeborn, William J. Hedley, or Kenneth Wischmeyer, were part-time, engaged for the particular assignment because their specialty, such as water, sewer, drainage, traffic, railroads, or architecture, was one the firm could not afford on a full-time basis.


Second, the city should have a full-time planning staff, headed by a competent and experienced city planner. If the city did not have such a staff (and until the 1960s many did not), who would be better able to head such a staff than the representative who had been sent to prepare the comprehensive plan? When the arrangements and the

interests were mutually agreeable, the "field man" stayed on and became the city's director of planning.

Harland Bartholomew's interest in carrying out comprehensive plans was so great that this became the standard procedure of his firm, despite the onerous requirements to secure and train professional personnel during periods when such personnel were in extremely short supply, e.g. shortly after World War II. (2).

PROCEDURES TO CARRY OUT THE PLAN

Harland Bartholomew, of course, was not the only person concerned with carrying out these comprehensive plans. Many were interested in solving this problem. Cities were legal creatures of their states and without the state letting them do so, they could not do any planning at all or



41 Norman Johnston's biography of Harland Bartholomew (1964) emphasized that the operations of Harland Bartholomew and Associates were a national and not just a local matter. This is one of the illustrations from his dissertation.

any control of land use. State after state enacted enabling legislation allowing first their cities and then their counties to do planning and zoning--many such acts being modeled on standard acts prepared in the 1920s by the Department of Commerce under the leadership of Herbert Hoover. (3)

These acts provided a two-part approach to preparing and carrying out a comprehensive plan. The planning acts usually described the comprehensive plan, what it was to include, how it was to be prepared, who was to adopt it (usually the city's plan commission) and the legal implications resulting from the act of

adoption. The zoning acts presupposed (or seemed to) the prior existence of a comprehensive plan, as many of them stated that zoning was only to be undertaken "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." While the legal profession quibbled for years over what this meant, the city planners knew exactly what was being said. The zoning acts then went on to give the city the authority to control the use of land and buildings, the location of buildings on their sites (lots), the maximum height of buildings, and the density of population.

All public improvements were to be in accordance with the adopted

comprehensive plan. Many public agencies operate and build in cities. Once a city adopted a comprehensive plan, none was to buy land or build a project without referring it to the plan commission (mandatory referrals) and receiving the commission's report thereon. Presumably, the report would be affirmative if the project agreed with the plan, and negative if it did not. The public agency sponsoring the project could overrule an adverse report of the plan commission but, according to this theory, public interest in seeing the comprehensive plan carried out would prevent this. With the public actions coordinated with the plan, the private actions would be taken care of by the zoning and land subdivision ordinances. This was the basic system devised to carry out the comprehensive plan.

Because of the need to exercise some type of authority over all public agencies operating in the city, the planning commission needed to be more than just another city department. A state legislature could authorize a city to appoint a planning commission that would then have a greater authority than the city itself -- the planning commission thus becoming an instrument of the state government, at least to the limited extent specified in the state law.

The system, as outlined above, is more easily described than accomplished. To some extent, results were similar to the cynic's remark about Christianity: "No one knows whether it works or not because no one has ever tried it." In any event, starting in the 1940s, other systems were tried and the planning function was placed here and there in the local government structure. As time went on, and particularly in the late 1940s and the 1950s, the importance of the official comprehensive plan in the structure was denigrated, as was the stature of the plan commissions. The plan commissions were

more and more "captured" by the real estate interests and lost the respect of the citizen, and lost or abandoned the constituency that had demanded that the city be built according to a plan. None of this improved the effectiveness of the planning function in local government; instead, it deteriorated. The original system devised in the standard planning enabling act may not have been workable, although in retrospect it is surprising that it was not given more of a try. Substitutes have been even less workable!

The first city plan to be officially adopted was that of the City of Cincinnati in 1925. Under Ohio law such adoption invoked mandatory referral procedures. Planners thought they had really discovered "the system." On January 21, 1926, George B. Ford presented a paper on the Cincinnati Plan before the City Planning Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers in New York City (4), saying:

For the first time in the United States, a complete comprehensive city plan has become the law of a city and the Cincinnati method is proving highly successful and is a distinct improvement on the strictly advisory powers of other planning commissions.

In 1938, Edward M. Bassett, author of the New York City zoning plan and Harland Bartholomew's erstwhile Sunday School teacher, published the "Master Plan" (5) dealing with this same subject. Bassett generally took a narrow, "legalistic" view of the problem and its solutions. He came to this conclusion: (pages 142 and 143)

A procedure that will harden or ossify a plan and make it difficult to amend quickly should not be adopted. A master plan should be a design for the coordination of the elements of the community

plan. It should be kept inside the four walls of the planning commission, not a secret document, but one capable of being readily changed, the last and best work of the commission.

If a master plan needs to be adopted by a local legislative body, if before any amendment hearings must be held and votes had by other bodies, if it must be filed in a county clerk's office, it becomes something different from the plastic instrument that it should be.

Persons attracted to the urban planning field in its early years were chiefly those with training in the physical design professions: civil engineers, architects, and landscape architects. A few lawyers were interested and particularly so when zoning was introduced, challenged in court, and, finally, was upheld by the Supreme Court. (6) As interest in the field became greater, it attracted persons in political science, sociology, and economics. The social scientists, particularly, did not like what they saw.

Robert Averill Walker was a doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago. For his dissertation, he examined "The Planning Function in Local Government," and the University of Chicago Press published this in 1941. (7) Walker noted that the first official planning commission had been created in 1907, and that by 1941 there were 1,000 city planning commissions. Walker set for himself the task he described as:

The city planning commission is in most cities the agency officially charged with the function of planning. Is it successfully executing this function?

To answer his question, Walker made a field study of 37 cities. Harland Bartholomew and Associates had prepared comprehensive plans in 11 of these.

In discussing city planning of the



42 Edward M. Bassett, 1910. In addition to being the author of the New York City Zoning Regulations of 1916 and of numerous books on planning and zoning, Bassett was Harland Bartholomew's Sunday School teacher.

1920s, Walker said: (page 35)

Planning was first of all businesslike--it was required to show a profit.

and on page 36:

It was inevitable that the consultants' predominant training in the architectural and engineering professions should cause them to seek improvement through redesign of the physical pattern of the city rather than to attack directly problems of urban sociology and economics.

Walker reveals his naivete by this statement because, under our democracy, a city government cannot directly attack problems of "urban sociology and economics," but can directly attack problems of physical development. Walker was a student unacquainted with the day-to-day operations of municipal government. He started looking for difficulties with "the

system" (of which Cincinnati was an example). He found them as a searcher may always find difficulties in any system if he starts to hunt for them.

Other findings of Walker's study were that:

The unpaid citizen commission has been almost universally adopted as the agency for carrying on the function of city planning. (page 133)

Participants in the planning movement have commonly felt that public officials are not sympathetic to the purposes of planning. (page 137) (Walker shows no understanding of why this is so.)

. members of commissions are greatly over-representative of the realty and construction fields. (page 152) (He should see them now.)

and

. very seldom does a majority of any commission have any well rounded understanding of the purposes and ramifications of planning. (page 157)

and finally

. the unpaid board is not proving satisfactory as a planning agency.

Strangely enough, Walker found an odd scapegoat for all of this--the planning consultant.

. the preponderant influence of the consultant system has been on the side of blocking the creation of full-time staffs." (page 213) "The future development of planning as a separate governmental service calls for a frank departure from the past tradition of consultant-made master plans. (page 214)

Walker saw the solution coming from

attaching the planning function to the executive--mayor or city manager--as a "staff aid". (This was a popular idea because no executive ever has to pay the slightest attention to a "staff aid.") He said further:

. the most fruitful line of development for the future would be the replacement of these (planning) commissions by a department or bureau attached to the office of mayor or city manager. (page 177)

Unfortunately, Walker's study was never repeated or checked and particularly by an expert in local government qualified to make such an analysis. It was seldom completely followed. Planning commissions were retained; planning departments with full-time staffs were added, with planning directors sometimes responsible to the executive, sometimes to the planning commission, and sometimes (believe it or not) to both!

Walker and succeeding students of this problem have missed several basic principles, including:

1. That you cannot have planning without a plan. You have to have a chart, a drawing, a statement--something--that outlines the future community. Otherwise you do not know where you are going.
2. Where you get the plan or what may be the quality of the plan, may not greatly matter, so long as it is "accepted." As Bettman said, "any plan is far superior to the chaos you have when there is no plan at all". (8)
3. Planning is anathema to a politician. Why? A plan makes decisions about where things go, how big they are, and even whether or not they are needed at

all. The politician uses control of decisions about where things go, how big they are, and even whether or not they are needed at all. The politician uses control of decisions on such matters to please his or her more vocal supporters or better-healed contributors. If the decisions are made by a "plan" or a "planning commission," what glory does the politician get? There is a basic, inherent, irreconcilable conflict here that just has to be faced. Harland Bartholomew stood on one side, Robert Walker and other public administrators on the other side--the side in favor of "painless planning"--really no planning at all. Any effective, long-range public planning process is painful, difficult, and not at all attractive to the politician.

4. Actions of other public agencies need to be coordinated. If the planning agency is merely another city department there is no way for this to be done.

In 1925, the American Civic Association published a series of articles on "City Planning Procedure." (9) One article by Harland Bartholomew contained the following statement:

A plan is not a fixed and static thing. Because of its numerous ramifications, it may not always apply precisely to a given set of conditions. The city plan must be kept 'alive.' It is for this reason that the [planning] commission should be a permanent institution and should have a paid staff in charge of a technically-trained person, to be known as the city planning engineer.

Obviously, not all of the planning consultants could be blamed for the failure of their client cities to have a full-time planning staff.

No one was more aware of the difficulties inherent in imposing an independent citizen

commission and its ideas on the day-to-day operations of a municipal bureaucracy and its political leadership than was Harland Bartholomew. He had a solution. That was to have the plan commission (he always preferred the word "plan" to "planning" in describing these commissions) consist of both officials and citizens. He envisioned the public works department cooperating with the planning commission because the head of the department was a member of the commission.

In 1923 he said:

I am not convinced--I will go further and say that I don't believe there is any uniform panacea that can be advanced or any method that can be offered for the handling of this question.

. . . .the matter of the enforcement of the plan is largely one that has to be studied very carefully in every community. It isn't one that can be set up arbitrarily to apply uniformly to all cities,

. . . . back of all successful work in government there must be understanding and cooperation. This, in turn, goes back to public opinion Keeping public opinion supporting the city plan is the proper way to secure the continuous execution of a large proportion of the plan There is certainly no force in public life which is greater than that of public opinion." (10)

Note that Harland Bartholomew did not expect that all of a comprehensive plan would be carried out; the best to be hoped for was the accomplishment of "a large proportion of the plan." No one system would work everywhere. Bartholomew saw, unlike other municipal government students, that the city government was only one of a number of public agencies operating in the urban area. There were counties, sometimes townships, always school districts, special

districts for such matters as sewers and parks, the state government itself, and handfuls of federal agencies. None of these would pay the slightest attention to a "staff aid" in the mayor's office, nor probably would the city council. Thus, there really had to be a plan commission appointed under a state law with the stature and legal power to bring all of these public agencies--of which the city was but one--together to accomplish a common purpose--to carry out a comprehensive plan. A commission of citizens and officials with carefully defined powers and responsibilities established by state law (or an interstate compact) seemed to be the answer. But each must be tailored to suit the needs of an individual community. There was no universal panacea.

Others took a far more limited view. In "Urban Planning and Municipal Public Policy," (11) Donald H. Webster in 1958 said:

The strongest case for integrating planning into the administrative hierarchy is based upon the idea that planning is comprehensive in scope and that plans can be carried into execution only by official sanction. Effective planning is possible, therefore, only if the planning agency has the complete confidence, interest, and respect of those who decide and execute policy. As a staff arm of the chief executive, planning becomes an integral part of the administrative process rather than an activity functioning somewhat at arm's length from it. This theory of organization rests upon the principle that since responsibility for policy decisions resides with the elective officials, who are accountable to the voters, so must responsibility for proper planning rest with those same officials insofar as planning serves as a basis for policy determination.

This matter is by no means settled, however. American cities still struggle with their planning function--where to put it in

the administrative structure, what is its responsibility, and who is to direct it. In 1973, Seattle completely reorganized its planning function, centralizing it in the executive (manager's) office, and charging it with preparing a new city plan. This proved such a failure that it was abandoned before ten years had passed. (12) Seattle proved again what Harland Bartholomew said in 1923: "I don't believe there is any uniform panacea that can be advanced or any method that can be offered for the handling of this question."

ADVANTAGES OF NOT INTEGRATING PLANNING WITH ADMINISTRATION

One of the first tasks confronting Harland Bartholomew when he came to St. Louis was the preparation of a major street plan. Most of the city had been built up or platted by then and the individual subdivider had done as he pleased. Most of the streets, even the important ones, were narrow--seldom with a right-of-way of more than 60 feet.

Because of the shape of the city, caused by the great curve in the Mississippi River, the foundation of the major street plan consisted of a thoroughfare to the northwest (Natural Bridge Avenue) connecting to a north-south artery, Twelfth Street (now Tucker Boulevard), located just west of the downtown core. This, in turn, linked to an artery leading southwest, Gravois Road. These were all proposed to be widened to a right-of-way of 100 feet.

How was this to be done? A combination of bond issue funds and benefit assessments was chosen. The benefit assessment system placed the costs on the fronting property owner, who was assessed the "benefit" of the added value of being

on a wide, well-paved and heavily traveled street, as well as his part of the cost. With passage of the 1923 bond issue, work began and major elements of the street plan gradually emerged.

As this was going on, Chevrolet announced, amid great civic rejoicing, that it would build an automobile assembly plant on a large tract of vacant land on the northwest corner of Union Boulevard and Natural Bridge. Widening of Natural Bridge had not proceeded that far to the west and Harland Bartholomew was interested in whether or not the new plant was located to allow for the planned widening. To his dismay, it was not. Chevrolet would build the new plant on the 60-foot line despite the fact that this was not necessary; the tract had ample depth to enable the building to be set back. He went to the Chamber of Commerce and then to the mayor. Both gave him the same story, saying, "You lay off. We moved heaven and earth to get these people to come here. We wouldn't dream of saying anything to them that would make them think twice and perhaps go to a competitive site. So far as we are concerned, if they will build the plant here they can build it any place they want to."

Driving home that evening, Harland Bartholomew was a discouraged man. Here was half a mile of one of the most important thoroughfares in the city. Lots across the street were shallow and all developed. Putting all the widening there would ruin them; and there would be nothing left to "benefit." The saddest part of all was that it was General Motors, an automobile manufacturer, who was going to put this crimp, this bottleneck, in the neat system Harland Bartholomew had devised to take care of their automobiles! It really was sad.

As he drove along though, he was


reminded that his car was a Buick and it occurred to him that Buick was a General Motors car. He knew the Buick dealer quite well. When he reached home, Harland Bartholomew picked up the telephone and called his friend the Buick dealer and told him the story. The Buick dealer told HB that General Motors really did not act that way. He knew the president of Buick well enough to also know that the Chevrolet president was a good friend of the Buick president and that he (the Buick dealer) would call the Buick president and tell him that General Motors was about to make a bad mistake in St. Louis.

The result was that the next day the Buick dealer called the Buick president and the Buick president called the Chevrolet president, and that evening a Chevrolet vice-president boarded the Wabash train for St. Louis to look into the matter. This he did. In the vice-president's judgment, the only problem with Harland Bartholomew's plan was that it was shortsighted. In the vice-president's judgment, Natural Bridge should be 120 feet wide not just 100 feet wide! He left orders to move the building to the 120-foot line, got on the next train, and went back to Detroit!

The integrity of the major street plan had been preserved. St. Louis became the second largest center of automobile production in the United States. Harland Bartholomew believed strongly that the city planner did much more than make plans. He saw to it that those plans were carried out, and to carry them out he was to use every legitimate means or strategy available to him.

In my practice, I used this story many, many times in training younger planners, most of whom were horrified at a "professional" staff member taking an action after the mayor had told him to "lay off,"

CITY OF
LINCOLN
NEBRASKA



ESTIMATED FUTURE 30TH. HIGHEST HOUR
TRAFFIC FLOW ON MAJOR STREET PLAN

LEGEND



43 This was an integral part of the Lincoln Comprehensive Plan of 1952. Future traffic increases were estimated based on anticipated changes in land use and population density proposed in other parts of the plan. Future traffic volumes were then related directly to the design of the major streets. This had not been done since the Cincinnati Plan of 1925. It is now standard street and highway planning practice.

and to use a procedure that might seem a bit underhanded. Years later, in Lincoln, Nebraska, we provided planning consulting services to the city for a period of a few years before the city and county organized a fully staffed planning department. The arrangement called for us to provide a full-time, trained, and experienced planner in the city. Then, at monthly intervals--usually at the time of the meeting of the planning commission--I would visit Lincoln, review what was going on, examine the zoning and land subdivision cases coming up, and make recommendations--based, of course, on whether or not the proposals conformed with the city's comprehensive plan, which had been prepared previously.

The Lincoln zoning ordinance contained two single-family residential districts, one requiring a minimum lot of 6,000 square feet and one a minimum lot of 9,000 square feet. On one of my monthly visits, our representative, Douglas Brogden, greeted me with the news that several developers had petitioned to change virtually all of the 9,000 square foot district in the south part of the city (several hundred acres) to the 6,000 square foot district, enabling them to build more homes, and to rather drastically change the character of a major part of the city. As Doug analyzed the situation, it appeared that it would be difficult to defeat this proposal. There was no interest, or opposition, from the public and the developers, with their emphasis on the practical, could be most persuasive.

Doug and I always checked every proposed zoning change on the ground before making our recommendations. While out looking at this one, we noticed a rather sizable house that sat on a hillside and overlooked most of the area that was proposed for the zoning change. Returning to the city hall, we located the house and

identified the owner. Remembering what Harland Bartholomew had done in the case of the St. Louis Chevrolet plant, Doug called the owner who fortunately was home. He had not known about the proposed zoning change, having been absent from the city, and was dismayed by the proposal.

Apparently, he also went right to work because at the planning commission meeting and at a subsequent city council meeting, over 100 citizens (including some of the most influential in Lincoln) appeared and opposed the zoning change. It never got off the ground. The comprehensive plan had been saved by one telephone call--again.

Quarrels over how to do it, however, did not affect the universal acceptance of the planning function as an obligation of local government. This was Harland Bartholomew's contribution. He was to make two more proposals that enlarged the scope of this obligation, one accepted and one partially so, as the local governments struggled with carrying out this new duty.

CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMMING

As work on the St. Louis plan progressed, the need of the rapidly growing city for improvements in what we now call its "infrastructure", became more and more pressing. Missouri requires a two-thirds favorable vote on referenda to issue general obligation bonds, and these were the only way to finance a large improvement program. Furthermore, much of St. Louis's growth had come from immigrants of a very conservative German extraction who were strongly opposed to any taxes at all.

Harland Bartholomew conceived the notion that the comprehensive plan could be used as a basis for a broad public works program. (See Appendix A.) The plan




FIGURE 26

44 A preliminary draft of this plan published as a Sunday feature in the Saint Louis Post Dispatch resulted in the gift of Babler State Park to the State of Missouri. Today, more than 55 years after publication of the first regional plan for Saint Louis in 1936, the dream of a regional park and parkway system for Saint Louis seems farther from reality than ever.

was generally accepted and supported by the population, and this would help with the electorate. Then, by carefully designing the public works program to fit all of the real needs of the city and by distributing its benefits equitably throughout the entire city, it was possible to arouse the interest and support of many groups and organizations. Finally, by issuing 20-year serial bonds over an 11-year period, financing would be over a 30-year period and tax impact would be

materially lessened.

It worked. An \$87 million bond issue was passed by the two-thirds vote in 1923. Similar issues of \$63 million in 1944 and \$110 million in 1954 were approved. There was no appreciable increase in the tax rate. Long-range capital improvement programming as an integral part of the municipal planning function had begun. Strangely, this most important planning function was completely missed in Robert

Walker's 1941 book despite its being listed, for example, in the Kalamazoo report 20 years before. (See Appendix A.)

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

The plan commissions established by the various state planning enabling acts consisted of between five and 15 members, some citizens and some officials. While these were intended to be broadly representative and to consist of knowledgeable and influential people, it became apparent to Harland Bartholomew, in reviewing the work he had done up to the depression years, that we were not establishing a broad enough base for the planning function. More people needed to be involved.

First tried in Newark, New Jersey when its comprehensive plan was brought up-to-date in 1945-47, the "citizens' advisory committee" added an additional element to the planning process. The advisory committees might have as many as 100 members. They would be divided into subcommittees, each charged with review of a particular aspect of a planning program. They would attend public presentations of the planning work as it came along, section by section or chapter by chapter. Many times committee members would represent entire organizations and would act as a liaison with them, thus getting many additional persons involved in the preparation of the comprehensive plan. It was a process of education and participation. It was more successful in some cities than in others. The comprehensive plans were improved by the reviews; the planning process was strengthened by the public education and support. The advisory committees became integral parts of the planning process used by Harland

Bartholomew and Associates after World War II.

The Newark Port and Airport was a dramatic example of the efficacy of the advisory committee process. Newark did not have the resources to properly improve its port and airport. The comprehensive plan proposed, and the advisory committee concurred, that the two facilities be turned over to the Port of New York Authority, which was willing to purchase them. The authority at that time did not operate any port or airport facilities. (13)

The city commission of Newark was most reluctant to do this because it would lose control over several thousand patronage jobs generated at these facilities. The citizens' advisory committee was able to persuade the city commission to approve the proposal of the Port Authority because the committee included virtually all of the leading citizens of Newark, and their combined influence could not be overcome. This was the start of the system of airports serving the metropolitan area, developed and maintained by the Port of New York Authority. It would not have been possible to persuade the City of New York to turn its airports over to the Port Authority if the City of Newark had not previously done so.

The need for the broader base for the local planning function was demonstrated again and again. While work with the advisory committees was time consuming and often frustrating, the benefits in subsequent accomplishment made them an essential part of the Harland Bartholomew and Associates planning process.

SUMMARY

Acceptance of the planning function as an integral element in the obligations of local government, strengthened by capital

improvement programming and a wider public participation, is Harland Bartholomew's second contribution to urban planning in the United States. While there have been many experiments with where to place the function in the governmental structure, and while few cities have yet learned how to manage what is at best a difficult and painful process, the function is accepted as something the municipality should do. The function may not be the most popular, but it has become almost universal, even so, and has spread to counties, some states, many public departments--such as highway, sewer, and park agencies--and even into the private realm, where we find the planning function carried on by corporations, universities, churches, foundations, and the like.

While only a few do a very good job of it, the fact that we recognize that we must do planning, we have to attribute in large part to Harland Bartholomew.


FOOTNOTES

- IV-1 Statement attributed to Elihu Root. See *American City Planning*, Mel Scott, page 202
- IV-2 See *The Foundations of Federal Planning Assistance - A personal Account of the 701 Program*, Carl Feiss, Journal of the American Planning Association, Volume 1, No. 2, Spring 1985, page 183
- IV-3 *A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act*, Advisory Committee on Zoning, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1924
A Standard City Planning Enabling Act, Advisory Committee on City Planning and Zoning, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1928
- IV-4 Ford and Goodrich with Ladislas Segoe as their representative (Technical Advisory Corporation) were authors of the Plan of Cincinnati.
- IV-5 *The Master Plan*, Edward M. Bassett, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1938
See also: *From The Autobiography of Edward*

- M. Bassett, pages 100-119 of *The American Planner - Biographies and Recollections*, edited by Donald A. Krueckeberg, Methuen, New York and London, 1983.
- IV-6 *Euclid v. Ambler*, decided by U.S. Supreme Court on November 26, 1926
- IV-7 *The Planning Function in Urban Government*, Robert A. Walker, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1941
- IV-8 See Alfred Bettman's *amici curiae* brief in the case of *Village of Euclid et al. v. Ambler Realty Company*.
- IV-9 *Factors Involved in Carrying Out The City Plan*, November 25, 1925, Manuscript in office of Harland Bartholomew & Associates, Inc., St. Louis, Mo.
- IV-10 *City Planning or the Science of City Building*, 1923, Manuscript in office of Harland Bartholomew & Associates, Inc., St. Louis, Mo.
- IV-11 *Urban Planning and Municipal Public Policy*, Donald H. Webster, Harper & Roe, 1958
- IV-12 See *Politics and Planning Agency Performance*, Lessons from Seattle, Linda C. Dalton, Journal of the American Planning Association, Volume 51, No. 2, Spring 1985, pages 189-199.
- IV-13 See particularly the 26th annual report of the *Port of New York Authority* (1946), page 3: "The Newark Survey - The City's request for a Port Authority airport and seaport survey followed a recommendation to the Central Planning Board of the City of Newark by their Consulting Engineers, Harland Bartholomew and Associates, that the Authority be asked to consider taking over the future development and administration of the Newark marine and air terminal."

The Port Authority entered into agreements with Newark and New York for development and administration of a regional airport system in 1947. The 1947 annual report stated:

During the year 1947 the Port Authority was engaged particularly in the initial steps of developing a great regional system of airports in the Port District.



45 One of the studies of the Newark Airport and Seaport made as part of the revised Comprehensive Plan of 1947. These studies showed that these facilities were beyond the financial capability of Newark to operate and improve. The solution was for the city to turn them over to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. This led, in turn, to the regional airport system of the New York Metropolitan Area.

The comprehensive city plan should be the outgrowth of exhaustive scientific studies of physical, social and economic facts relating to past, present and probable future growth and competent interpretation of those facts by the Commission with the aid of its technical advisors and assistants.

- Pittsburgh, 1925

The modern city plan is not only concerned with improving the city's appearance, which was the primary purpose of the earlier plans, but it is equally concerned with improving efficiency and coincidentally with developing a more orderly, healthful, and desirable place in which to live. It should be noted that a city plan deals with physical elements and financial policies rather than with political considerations. The six phases or physical elements usually considered in any comprehensive city plan are Major Streets, Transportation, Transit, Zoning, Recreation, and Civic Art or Public Buildings.

- Saint Louis, 1932

Every successful industrial or business organization adopts a plan of some type which serves as a general guide in deciding upon specific policies or in making expenditures for permanent improvements. Is not the conduct of municipal business just as important as that of an industrial or commercial organization?

- Saint Louis, 1932

If we are to build wisely, we must look behind the mere physical planning of streets, transportation, zoning or parks, and examine the whole social and economical concept of city life.

- East Saint Louis, 1933

If we are unwilling to accept the fact that times have changed or we believe that things should be just as they used to be and we insist that policies and practices must not change, then difficulties must inevitably arise. If, on the other hand, we recognize that when we sell real estate, we should offer a product that will stand up well over the years, then we should welcome information and planning that will do most to achieve this end.

- Memphis, 1938